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Sexual Predator Law-The Nightmare in the
Halls of Justice
Robert C. Boruchowitz*
K. lived in a country with a legal constitution, there was uni-
versal peace, all the laws were in force; who dared seize him
in his own dwelling?1
I. THE STORY
It is 1992. You are the defense attorney representing a cli-
ent, B., who has been arrested by the state as a potential "sex-
ually violent predator."2 For the four months prior to his
arrest, B. lived and worked in the community, reporting to the
Department of Corrections as required after serving his full
prison sentence for two 1987 second degree rape convictions.'
He was employed and had just obtained a new job to go fishing
in Alaska when he was arrested.4 The state does not accuse B.
of committing a new offense. Yet the state does seek to lock
him up indefinitely in a "treatment facility" located inside a
prison.
B. is taken to this facility to await trial. Inside the facility,
he has fewer rights than he did in prison as a convicted crimi-
* Robert C. Boruchowitz has been Director of the Seattle-King County Defender
Association since 1978. He received his J.D. from Northwestern University School of
Law in 1973 and his A.B. from Kenyon College in 1970. He is co-counsel in the Young
and Cunningham cases challenging the sexually violent predator law in the
Washington Supreme Court.
1. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (1937).
2. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.09, entitled Sexually Violent Predators Act, was passed
by the legislature in 1990 and provides for indefinite commitment "until such time as
the person's mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that the
person is safe to be at large." WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.060(1) (Supp. 1990-91).
3. See Clerk's Papers at 1183-86, 1311-13, State v. Cunningham (King County
Super. Ct. 1991) (No. 90-2-20568-1) [hereinafter CP Cunningham]. This imaginary
scenario is based on a combination of actual events and procedures from several
different cases brought in King County. In addition to Cunningham, the scenario
refers to State v. Young (King County Super. Ct. 1991) (No. 90-2-21319-6); it also refers
to In re McL (King County Super. Ct. 1992) (No. 91-2-24039-6) (dismissed on motion of
the state in March, 1992).
4. Report of Proceedings at 113, State v. Cunningham (King County Super. Ct.
filed May 29, 1991) (No. 90-2-20568-1) [hereinafter RP Cunningham].
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nal. On the outside, the media swarm like locusts, grasping the
prosecutors' statements about the newly accused "sexual
predator."5
As you begin work on B.'s case, you first discover that
when the state obtained the arrest order for your client, in an
ex parte proceeding, it failed to tell the judge that the only
psychologist who actually interviewed B. concluded that B. did
not meet the statutory criteria for a "sexually violent
predator."' The state also failed to tell the judge that the two
psychologists it did rely on disagreed on an element of the
diagnosis.7 But when you attempt to challenge the probable
cause determination in court, the judge refuses your challenge
because you have not made a sufficient showing. You also
attempt to have B. considered for pretrial release, but the
judge finds that no bail or release hearing is possible and that
your client may not attend any pretrial hearings.'
At some of these pretrial hearings, the state argues that
the trial will be a civil proceeding. The state seeks to classify
the trial as civil for several reasons; one reason is that the state
argues that it can commit the accused with a nonunanimous
jury if the trial is classified as civil.9 The judge rules that even
5. See, e.g., Marla Williams, Predator's Release is Blocked-Maleng Takes Rare
Action to "Make our World Safe," THE SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 24, 1990, at Al, and
County Wants "Sex Predator" in Prison, THE MORNING NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma), May
9, 1991, at B1. Seattle television stations ran numerous stories in October 1990, with
leads such as the following- "King County is launching a bold new effort to stop sex
crimes .... Today the King County Prosecutor believes he found the perfect criminal
to test this law." The Nightly News (KOMO Television broadcast, Oct. 24, 1990).
6. The statute requires the state to prove that the accused has either a personality
disorder or a "mental abnormality" that "makes the person likely to engage in
predatory acts of sexual violence." WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(1) (Supp. 1990-91). In
one case, the prison psychologist who interviewed the accused while he still was in
prison could find nothing in the DSM-III-R diagnostic manual that described the
accused and certainly no diagnosis that would prompt him to act out in a sexually
violent way. CP Cunningham at 1274-76. When asking the judge to arrest the accused,
the prosecutor did not tell the judge about this psychologist's opinion. CP
Cunningham at 1277-79.
7. CP Cunningham at 1277-1281.
8. The statute is silent on the question of pretrial release. One trial court judge
has ruled that the accused did not need to be geographically near for counsel to
prepare effectively, that the accused had no right to be present before trial, and that
the statute does not address pretrial release; therefore, a release hearing was not
necessary. Clerk's Papers at 9, State v. Young (King County Super. Ct. 1991) (No. 90-2-
21319-6) [hereinafter CP Young]; Report of Proceedings at 19-20, State v. Young (King
County Super. Ct. filed Oct. 29, 1991) (No. 90-2-21319-6) [hereinafter RP Young].
9. While the statute calls for proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it does not address
the question of jury unanimity or describe itself as civil or criminal. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 71.09.060 (Supp. 1990-91). Trial judges have decided this failure to specify unanimity
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though B. faces an indeterminate term in the prison treatment
facility, the proceeding is civil; therefore, a unanimous jury is
not required. Further, the jury may not be told that the com-
mitment will be indefinite or that the facility is in a prison; nor
may the jury be told that the burden will be on B. to prove
that he should be released, if he is committed."0 At other hear-
ings, the prosecutor argues that the trial will be "akin to" a
criminal case to prevent the jury from hearing about the conse-
quences of their verdict."
Further, in another unreported ex parte proceeding, the
judge rules that B. has no Fifth Amendment protections relat-
ing to the trial and may be required to talk to the state's"expert" witness about his most secret thoughts and feelings.
The state lists a psychologist as its key witness, but it does not
produce the psychologist's report until a month after the state
received the report. When challenged, the prosecution says it
had no obligation to produce the report because "this is a civil
case." The state also resists your efforts to depose its psycholo-
gist. You advise B. not to talk to the state's witnesses.
At the trial, however, the judge allows into evidence B.'s
refusal to talk to the state's psychologist; the judge also allows
the state to argue that B.'s refusal to talk supports the state's
allegation of his dangerousness. In a separate evidentiary
issue, the judge allows into evidence the accused's eleven-year-
old juvenile assault offense record, despite the fact that it was
not a conviction and that the evidence would not be allowable
under relevant evidence rules and case law.12 The judge even
allows into evidence B.'s twenty-year-old misdemeanor "threat
to bomb" conviction, stemming from a college campus meeting
in 1972, to show B.'s "sexual dangerousness."'3
The state calls as witnesses two police officers who took a
statement from the client in 1962 and fails to disclose that one
of the officers has a criminal trespass conviction and was
demoted from chief of police in a controversy over misfeasance
in the vice squad. The other officer was removed from the vice
permits 10-2 verdicts. CP Cunningham at 1740-44; RP Cunningham at 36-51 (May 8,
1991). One of the verdicts was 11-1. CP Cunningham at 1902.
10. RP Young at 91-108 (Feb. 13, 1991); RP Young at 1-19 (Feb. 14, 1991).
11. RP Young at 2 (Feb. 14, 1991).
12. State v. Schaaf, 109 Wash. 2d 1, 743 P.2d 240 (1987); WASH. R. EVID. 609.1; FED.
R. EVID. 609(d): Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible under
this rule.
13. RP Young at 34, 49 (Mar. 4, 1991).
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squad. None of this was disclosed to the defense, and in fact
one of the officers, questioned before the trial by the defense,
said he had never been charged or convicted of a crime and
had had no disciplinary problems while a police officer. When
you discover this history from a reporter, the judge does not
permit you to recall the witnesses to inquire about it.14
When you seek to call B. in his own defense, the judge
rules that he may not testify until after he has been deposed
by the state. The judge allows the state's psychologist to wit-
ness the testimony and to testify about it. The state's psycholo-
gist is allowed to testify that B. meets the statutory definition
of "sexual predator,"' 5 thereby performing the jury's job.
When you ask for time and money to fly your own expert back
to testify about her interview with the client, the judge denies
the motion.
At the appropriate time, you submit proposed jury instruc-
tions on the presumption of innocence under the statutorily
mandated'6 beyond a reasonable doubt standard. The judge
refuses your instructions, however, and instead admits into evi-
dence a jury instruction from B.'s 1963 rape trial: "The rule of
law... is not designed to aid one who is in fact guilty of crime
to escape, but it is a humane provision of law intended, so far
as human agencies can, to prevent any innocent person being
unjustly punished."' 7
Under this instruction, the jury in effect is told that the
reasonable doubt protection is a humane provision that is not
applied to one guilty of crime. B.'s prior convictions already
have been admitted, so the reasonable doubt standard does not
seem to apply to B. under this instruction. Instead, the pre-
sumption of innocence slides toward a presumption of guilt.
The instruction makes the presumption of innocence seem like
a charitable provision applied only once the jury has found the
person to be innocent, rather than the bedrock of the law. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held this instruction to be prej-
14. RP Young at 98-9, 100, 104 (Feb. 27, 1991).
15. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(1) (Supp. 1990-91): "Sexually violent predator"
means any person who has been convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual
violence and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that
makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. Id.
§ 71.09.060(1) requires that "[t]he court or jury shall determine whether, beyond a
reasonable doubt, the person is a sexually violent predator."
16. Id. § 71.09.060(1).
17. CP Young at 722.
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udicial error in 1956.18
Impossible? Can't happen in America? Combinations of
these unimaginable events happened in sexual predator cases
in Washington in 1991 and 1992. These trials might as easily be
occurring in the fictional world of Franz Kafka, where inno-
cent people are arrested, tried, and executed without ever
knowing why, without their advocates ever knowing the infor-
mation against them.
Was help at hand? ... Where was the Judge whom he had
never seen? Where was the High Court, to which he had
never penetrated? 19
II. THE INTRODUCTION
The hysteria that produced the statute authorizing com-
mitment of persons found to be sexually violent predators has
spawned legal procedures used against the accused that are
unlike any others in Washington's jurisprudence. The accused
faces a nightmarish procedure that begins with the highly pub-
licized and emotionally charged labeling of his alleged status,
and then proceeds to exclude him from hearings, handicaps his
lawyer, and allows into evidence against him irrelevant and
prejudicial material that would not be permitted in other cases.
The accused has fewer protections than a defendant in a shop-
lifting case or a parent in a dependency case. He has fewer
rights than a mentally ill person being detained in a civil com-
mitment case because the state labels him not mentally ill, but
"mentally abnormal." Further, the prosecutor's arbitrary
application of the labels "civil" or "akin to criminal" creates an
artificial, hybrid proceeding in which labels are used to deny
fundamental rights.
The legislatively created definition of a "sexually violent
predator," relying as it does on the nonscientific term "mental
abnormality," is unique. It is unsupported by medical research
or testimony. The term "mental abnormality" is not recog-
nized by mental health professionals. Using this legislatively
created status of mental abnormality to detain preventively
people who have completed their original court imposed crimi-
nal sentences has led to a distorted judicial proceeding in
18. Reynolds v. United States, 238 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1956).
19. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (1937).
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which the most basic individual protections have been
sacrificed.
Part of this distortion has been the result of reliance on
contrived psychological speculation as a purported scientific
basis for the state's commitment action. It is contrived in part
because it adjusts to a nonscientific concept of mental abnor-
mality. One might expect that when a new concept like
mental abnormality is developed and applied to a person on
trial for his freedom, the courts would ensure that expert testi-
mony interpreting that concept would meet the same standard
of evidence that any new and unproven concept must. Yet the
trial courts have been unwilling to subject this novel approach
to the same basic evidentiary test applied to fingerprints, radar
guns, breath machines, and DNA testing.
The carte blanche provided to prosecutors to proceed as
they choose under the statute has led trial courts to refuse to
apply the Frye test 20 to this new psychological speculation
about "mental abnormality."
Prosecutors have presented contorted arguments to avoid
application of Frye. This Article will demonstrate that the
unfounded psychological speculation offered by the state
should be subjected to at least the same standard of evidence
that a blood test or breath machine must meet. This examina-
tion will illustrate the type of distortions that the courts have
sanctioned in the predator prosecutions.
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH THE STATUTORY SCHEME
The statute enabling the civil commitment of sexually vio-
lent predators is based on a novel assertion, unparalleled in
American law, that unspecified mental attributes can produce
acts of sexual violence and that these acts can be predicted
accurately.21 To prove the allegations based on this assertion,
the prosecutor presents one psychologist's testimony in each
case. The psychologist asserts that he can diagnose a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that makes the accused
20. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See infra note 24.
21. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (Supp. 1990-91) states as follows: "The
legislature finds ... [i]n contrast to persons appropriate for civil commitment under
chapter 71.05 RCW, sexually violent predators generally have antisocial personality
features which are unamenable to existing mental illness treatment modalities and
those features render them likely to engage in sexually violent behavior." Nowhere
does the legislature specify or define the features involved or cite authority for this
conclusion.
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likely to commit predatory acts; the psychologist's testimony
also asserts that he can predict that the person on trial is likely
to commit predatory acts.
In the cases brought in King County and Walla Walla
County to date, only two state witnesses, both psychologists,
have testified that they are capable of making such assess-
ments. The defendants have presented psychologists and one
psychiatrist who have said that assessments linking personality
disorders or unspecified "abnormality" to future sexual vio-
lence and predicting that a particular person is likely to com-
mit violent acts, cannot scientifically be made.22  This
testimony, purporting to analyze mental states and predict
future acts, lies at the heart of the state's case, as the following
excerpt from one trial transcript shows:
A: I formed a diagnostic impression that Mr. [B.] appeared
to meet the statutory definition of sexual-
[Defense Counsel]: Objection, your honor. That's the ulti-
mate question for the jury, not for this doctor.
The Court: The objection is overruled.
The witness: To meet the statutory definition of sexually
violent predator.23
These psychologists' assertions of predictive capabilities
based on novel, legislatively-created psychological theories
must be subject to the standard requirements for all new theo-
ries as ennunciated in Frye v. United States.24 Thus, the spe-
cific issue on appeal in the sexual predator cases might be
framed as follows: Under Frye and relevant Washington statu-
22. RP Young at 111 (Mar. 1, 1991); RP Young at 99-103, 171-73 (Mar. 4, 1991).
23. RP Young at 152 (Feb. 27, 1991).
24. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye rule requires that the reliability of new
scientific methods be tested on three factors: "1) the validity of the underlying
principle; 2) the validity of the technique applying that principle; and 3) the validity
of the application of the technique used on the particular occasion." State v. Huynh, 49
Wash. App. 192, 194-95, 742 P.2d 160, 163 (1987), review denied, 109 Wash. 2d 1024
(1988) (citing Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
United States, a Ha-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1980)). The state
has never established these factors in a sexual predator case. The purpose of the Frye
rule is to prevent a jury from being misled by unproven and ultimately unsound
scientific methods. People v. Shirley, 641 P.2d 775, 782-84 (Cal.), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
1125 (1982) (holding that Frye applies to hypnotically aided recall). "The rationale of
the Frye standard is that expert testimony may be permitted to reach a trier of fact
only when the reliability of the underlying scientific principles has been accepted by
the scientific community." State v. Canaday, 90 Wash. 2d 808, 813, 585 P.2d 1185, 1187
(1978).
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tory and decisional law,2" did the trial court err when it failed
to require a Frye hearing before admitting testimony on a new
psychological theory that asserts 1) there is a mental disorder
that predisposes a person to commit rape; 2) the respondents
suffered from such a disorder; and 3) therefore, the respon-
dents would commit acts of sexual violence in the future? Spe-
cifically, under Frye, did the court err when the new
psychological theory 1) is supported by only two psychologists;
2) is not recognized in the scientific literature; 3) is not sup-
ported by evidence of a consensus in the scientific community;
and 4) is contradicted by defense evidence of a consensus in
the scientific community opposed to the new theory?
The brief answer is yes.
The first problem with these purported psychological theo-
ries is that the label mental abnormality has no meaning. In
effect, the psychologists who testified for the prosecution were
using a legislative concept to diagnose persons as mentally
abnormal and then to tie that abnormality to likely future
behavior. But Dr. Nancy Steele, who supervises the Minnesota
Department of Corrections Transitional Sexual Offender Pro-
gram, testified at one trial that the statutory definition of
mental abnormality could not be applied "in any consistent,
fair, rational way by the psychiatric or psychological commu-
nity ... because no one knows for sure what causes rape .... I
do not believe that it is caused by an illness or disease. ' 26
25. Two Washington cases are particularly relevant in the sexual predator
context: first, State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 745 P.2d 12 (1987) (holding that the
Frye test does apply in Washington in a case involving rape trauma syndrome); second,
State v. Fitzgerald, 39 Wash. App. 652, 659, 694 P.2d 1117, 1122, qff'd sub non. 110
Wash. 2d 403, 756 P.2d 105 (1988) (holding inadmissible under Frye a psychologist's
testimony that child molesters could have outward manifestations of good character
because no evidence was presented that the opinion was based on a generally accepted
theory in the psychological community).
26. RP Young at 112 (Mar. 1, 1991). The legislature itself was concerned that the
term mental abnormality is vague. At the Senate Law and Justice hearing, Professor
David Boerner, principal draftsperson of the new law, testified in response to a
question about vagueness:
Abnormality is a very broad term.... What we had in mind was the case like
Shriner where you had direct physical evidence of plans to commit future
crimes, diaries, notes, and those sorts of things. I think absent that, that kind
of evidence or something, it's simply a psychiatric prediction plus the crime
years ago [and it] isn't going to be enough to satisfy a jury under the standards
we've provided.
David Boerner, Tape of Testimony at the Senate Law and Justice Hearing (Jan. 11,
1990) (transcribed by Defender Association staff from legislature tape) (on file with
author).
[Vol. 15:827
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Moreover, when testifying before the state legislature, Lucy
Berliner of Washington's Harborview Sexual Assault Center, a
member of the task force that drafted the sexual predator leg-
islation, testified regarding the lack of definition for mental
abnormality as follows: "But you're right that mental abnor-
mality per se is not meaningful in terms of our diagnostic
theme and some of the forensic practitioners that I talked to
before coming here said they would find it helpful to have
some definition. 27
There is no substantiated psychological understanding that
establishes a causal link between rape and "mental abnormali-
ties." The only physician to testify in the sex predator cases,
Dr. G. Christian Harris, a psychiatrist with more than twenty
years of experience, stated that there is no personality disorder
or mental abnormality that makes a person likely to commit
an act of sexual violence in the future.
Challenging any attempt to link mental condition and the
prediction of future predatory acts of sexual violence, the
Washington Psychiatric Association (WSPA) appeared as ami-
cus in the Washington State Supreme Court. 29 The WSPA
argued that it "is impossible to generalize a causal connection
between sexual offenses in general and any particular psychi-
atric condition."3 ° Indeed, as Dr. Barbara Schwartz, director of
the Sex Offender Treatment Program of the Washington
Department of Corrections, testified, "there's very little evi-
dence that personality disorders are related to [committing a
sex offense] in any meaningful way."'" No causal link has
27. Lucy Berliner, Tape of Testimony at the Senate Law and Justice Hearing
(Jan. 11, 1990) (transcribed by Defender Association staff from legislature tape) (on
file with author). The legislature defined mental abnormality as follows:
"Mental abnormality" means a congenital or acquired condition affecting the
emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to the
commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting such person a
menace to the health and safety of others.
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(2) (Supp. 1990-91).
28. RP Young at 99-103 (Mar. 4, 1991). Specifically responding to the state's
witnesses' opinions, Dr. Harris testified that a personality disorder not otherwise
specified, with antisocial paranoid borderline and narcissistic features, does not
predispose a person to rape. Id.
29. In the Young case, the WSPA appeared as amicus at the trial level, where it
was joined by the Washington State Association of Community Psychiatrists, and at
the State Supreme Court level. See CP Young at 339-50, 635-36, 640-43; Amicus Curiae
Brief of Washington State Psychiatric Ass'n, In re Young (Wash. filed Sept. 26, 1991)
(No. 57837-1) [hereinafter Amicus Brief of WSPA].
30. Amicus Brief of WSPA, supra note 29, at 4.
31. R.P. Young at 18 (Jan. 22, 1991).
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been established between mental abnormalities and predatory
behavior.
There is no established psychological understanding that
links rape with a mental disorder or that supports a prediction
that a given offender is more likely than not to reoffend vio-
lently. Dr. Schwartz, a forensic psychologist with over twenty
years of experience who specializes in sex offenders, testified
that she could never predict whether a particular rape
offender would be fifty-one percent likely to reoffend.32 Dr.
Schwartz testified that a recent study by Marshall and Barbieri
showed that "rapists have a reoffense rate of between 7 and 35
percent. '33 The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that only
7.7 percent of released rapists were rearrested for rape within
three years of their release.' As Dr. Harris testified at trial,35
neither psychologists nor psychiatrists can predict whether a
particular person will reoffend.
IV. THE TRIAL AND THE FRYE TEST
How should the courts handle this proffered speculative
testimony? Washington's courts have guarded against the use
of such speculative psychological testimony, ruling that psy-
chologists sailing in uncharted waters may not do so before a
jury." Operating under the guidance of Frye,37 and Washing-
ton Rule of Evidence 702 (ER 702),38 the courts have held that
in order for expert testimony to be admissible, 1) the witness
must be qualified as an expert; 2) the witness's opinion must
be based "upon an explanatory theory generally accepted in
the scientific community"; and 3) the witness's testimony must
be helpful to the jury.39
In the sexual predator cases, the expert's testimony is not
32. RP Young at 18 (Jan. 22, 1991).
33. Id. at 26.
34. Amicus Brief of WSPA, supra note 29, at 4.
35. RP Young at 109-09 (Mar. 4, 1991).
36. See, e.g., State v. Fitzgerald, 39 Wash. App. 652, 659, 694 P.2d 1117, 1122 (1985),
aff'd sub. nom. 110 Wash. 2d 403, 756 P.2d 105 (1988).
37. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
38. WASH. R. EVID. 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
39. State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 341, 745 P.2d 12, 15 (1987). Black held that
expert testimony based on the new psychological theories involving "rape trauma
syndrome" was subject to the Frye test. Id.
[Vol. 15:827
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based on an explanatory theory that is generally accepted in
the scientific community, as the authorities cited above indi-
cated.4 ° In fact, those authorities show that the consensus in
the scientific community is that there is not a personality dis-
order or mental abnormality that makes a person likely to
commit sexual acts of violence. Other than the two witnesses
called by the state, no scientific professional person cited by
the state agrees that such testimony can ethically and compe-
tently be given. As the WSPA's amicus brief to the Washing-
ton Supreme Court suggests, such testimony is not
competent.4 '
If such testimony is not competent under ER 702 and Frye,
it logically cannot be "helpful to the jury." Such testimony
presented in sexual predator cases invades the province of the
jury because it constitutes an opinion as to the guilt of the
accused.42 That is, such testimony involves the ultimate issue
for the factfinder: Whether these accused would, because of a
mental condition, commit sexual crimes in the future. Expert
testimony expressing a witness's opinion whether the defend-
ant meets the statutory definition of "sexual predator" 43 could
be seen by the jury as determinative.
40. See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text. A recent law review comment
suggests the use of a modified Frye test. Gary Gleb, Comment, Washington's Sexually
Violent Predator Law: The Need to Bar Unreliable Psychiatric Predictions of
Dangerousness from Civil Commitment Proceedings, 39 UCLA L. REv. 213 (1991).
The comment argues that the value of the procedural safeguards in Washington's
predator law is questionable "because Washington is free to present unreliable
psychiatric evidence," namely, shaky long-term predictions that most psychiatrists
refuse to make. Id. at 233-34. It concludes that " ... the absence of any reliable means
of identifying sex crime recidivists shows that Washington's law is ill-conceived." Id.
at 247. The author suggests admitting expert testimony only if the technique has won
at least substantial acceptance within the appropriate community after critical scrutiny
by the community. This would not require consensus but would require that the
appropriate community "not generally reject the technique or regard it as
insufficiently tested." Id. at 245 n.206. The comment suggests also requiring evidence
of a pool of experts larger than the ones testifying, to be able to demonstrate that the
technique has been tested according to reigning methodology and has been reviewed in
a reasonable number of published studies. Id. at 245.
The commentator seems to assume that the prediction of long-term dangerousness
is not novel and therefore Frye normally would not apply. Id. at 246 n.211. In fact, the
development of long-term predictions based on a legislatively contrived mental
abnormality and the diagnosis of sexually violent predator are novel and Frye must be
applied.
41. Amicus Brief of WSPA, supra note 29, at 4. The WSPA wrote that "mental
health professionals do not consider sex offenders to be suffering from a personality
disorder which causes an individual to commit a sex offense." Id. at 5.
42. State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 348-49, 745 P.2d 12, 18-19 (1987).
43. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24.
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The Black rule prohibiting invading the province of the
jury rests on a sound foundation. First, such testimony"unfairly prejudices the [defendant] by creating an aura of spe-
cial reliability and trustworthiness" around the concepts of
mental abnormality and predictability." To permit an expert
to suggest that, because of symptoms of a legislatively defined"mental abnormality," a person is going to commit sexual
crimes in the future unfairly prejudices the accused by creating
an aura of special reliability around the speculative testi-
mony. 5 The danger of prejudice is particularly acute when, as
here, the testifying expert states that the accused are likely to
commit future acts of "predatory" sexual violence, which is in
essence an answer to the question the jury was asked.'
A second reason to reject this testimony is that allowing it
undermines the jury system itself. As Karl Tegland empha-
sizes, "[a]n expert may not go so far as to usurp the exclusive
function of the jury to weigh the evidence and determine cred-
ibility." 7  As the Washington Supreme Court succinctly put
the point, "[n]o witness, lay or expert, may testify to his opin-
ion as to the guilt of a defendant, whether by direct statement
or inference. '4' To allow such testimony threatens the
accused's due process right to a fair jury trial.
In these cases, there is an independent reason to exclude
44. People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291, 301 n.14 (Cal. 1984), cited with approval in
State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 349, 745 P.2d 12, 19 (1987). In Bledsoe, the California
Supreme Court contrasted psychological testimony on rape trauma syndrome to other
scientific methods of proof, such as fingerprints and blood tests, which have been
admitted into evidence. Id.
45. The Bledsoe court held that expert testimony suggesting, based on symptoms,
that a victim had been raped "unfairly prejudices the appellant by creating an aura of
special reliability and trustworthiness." Bledsoe, 681 P.2d at 301 (quoting State v.
Saldara, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982)). In a Ninth Circuit case upholding the
application of the Frye test to exclude testimony about the use of so-called
anatomically correct dolls, the court held that "the prejudicial effect of an aura of
scientific respectability outweigh[s] the slight probative value of the evidence." United
States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475, 480 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Solomon,
753 F.2d 1522, 1526 (9th Cir. 1985)).
46. Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 340, 745 P.2d at 14. In Black, the court held that the use
of the term rape trauma syndrome constitutes, in essence, a statement that the
defendant is guilty of the crime of rape. Id.
47. 5A K. TEGLAND, WASH. PRAC. EVIDENCE § 292, at 39 n.4 (2d ed. 1982), cited in
State v. Fitzgerald, 39 Wash. App. 652, 659, 694 P.2d 1117, 1122 (1985), aff'd sub nom.
110 Wash. 2d 403, 756 P.2d 105 (1988).
48. Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 348, 745 P.2d at 18. The Black court emphasized that
expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome is unfairly prejudicial because it
constitutes an opinion as to the guilt of the defendant, invading the province of the
factfinder. Id.
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the psychologist's prediction-the testimony itself lacks relia-
bility. To be found reliable in Washington, expert testimony
on a new scientific theory must meet the three-pronged Frye
standard:49 1) the underlying principle must be valid; 2) the
technique applying that principle must be valid; and 3) the
application of the technique used on the particular occasion
must be valid.' As to the first prong, as the authorities cited
earlier partially demonstrate,5' the underlying principle of pre-
dicting future predatory acts based on a diagnosis of the legis-
latively created concept of "mental abnormality" is not valid.
Another reason that the principle underlying such testimony is
invalid is that the variety of circumstances and factors in the
lives of sexual offenders make prediction based on such a clas-
sification highly questionable.52
Given the overwhelming lack of scientific support for the
notion that mental abnormalities exist that allow predictions
of future predatory acts, it is little wonder that the state argues
against the application of the Frye test in the sexual predator
cases. The state relies on State v. Young,53 which addressed
the use of medical testimony involving a colposcope5 4 The
court found that the physician "merely testified that certain
49. Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 342, 745 P.2d at 15. The Washington courts have applied
this analysis in excluding hypnosis evidence (State v. Martin, 101 Wash. 2d 713, 684
P.2d 651 (1984)) and in disallowing expert testimony regarding the alleged propensity
of baby-sitting boyfriends to inflict child abuse (State v. Mulder, 29 Wash. App. 513,
629 P.2d 462 (1981)).
50. See supra note 22.
51. See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 344, 745 P.2d at 16, wherein the court found
that symptoms of rape victims embrace such a '"road spectrum of human behavior"
that a diagnosis of rape trauma syndrome provides a highly questionable means of
identification. The state's experts in the predator cases relied primarily on record
reviews and did not interview people who knew the accused. RP Young at 146-47 (Feb.
27, 1991); RP Young at 31-36 (Feb. 28, 1991); RP Cunningham at 29-31, 56-57 (May 21,
1991). One said that "[ojur ability to predict people's future behavior is really quite
imperfect." RP Young at 140 (Feb. 27, 1991). He acknowledged that mental
abnormality is a statutory term and that professionals trying to apply the term each
would have to establish their own working definition. RP Young at 111-12 (Feb. 28,
1991). Cf State v. Huynh, 49 Wash. App. 192, 197-98, 742 P.2d 160, 162, review denied,
109 Wash. 2d 1024 (1988) (finding the expert's reliance on his own small, nonrandom
experiments to be insufficient in the absence both of publication and other studies
duplicating the expert's results). Id.
53. 62 Wash. App. 895, 802 P.2d 829 (1991). Young involved testimony by a
physician regarding her medical examination of an alleged rape victim. The court
permitted the physician's opinion that the complaining witness' condition was
consistent with sexual abuse. Id. at 899, 802 P.2d at 831.
54. A colposcope is a magnifying device used to take photographs of microscopic
injuries.
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clinical findings existed, and that in her own professional expe-
rience those clinical findings were consistent with penetration
and abuse."5
There are several reasons why Young is not controlling.
Young concerned medical evidence, not psychological evi-
dence. This is a major distinction because the medical testi-
mony was based on injuries that were "physical, observable,
and measurable, and had few possible causes other than sexual
abuse,"' while the mental abnormality testimony is based on
psychological speculation that is neither physical nor measura-
ble. Indeed, the Young court itself distinguished the Black
case, which involved a psychological determination of "rape
trauma syndrome," because of this very distinction.
In the sexual predator cases, there is no injury to be
observed through a microscope; there are no clinical findings,
examining physicians, medical tests, or even interviews
involved in these cases. The state's experts may never have
even seen the accused until the trial. In fact, these "experts"
have no personal clinical experience with treatment of sex
offenders in prison.
The California appellate court has emphasized these dis-
tinctions in a case upholding the admissibility of colposcopic
examination and a physician's opinions based on it, saying:
[T]he expression of an expert medical opinion as to the cause
of a wound or injury falls outside of the realm of what is
subject to the Kelly-Frye rule. An expert medical witness is
qualified to give an opinion on the cause of a particular
injury based on his or her deduction from the appearance of
the injury itself.58
55. Young, 62 Wash. App. at 899, 905-06, 802 P.2d at 831, 834-35. California courts
have allowed an expert's testimony concerning colposcopy, stating that the Frye test
did not apply to the expression of expert medical opinions "concerning the cause of an
injury." People v. Pitts, 273 Cal. Rptr. 757, 903 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). The California
court wrote in Shirley: "We do not doubt that if testimony based on a new scientific
process operating on purely psychological evidence were to be offered in our courts, it
would likewise be subjected to the Frye standard of admissibility." People v. Shirley,
641 P.2d 775, 795 (Cal. 1982).
56. Young, 62 Wash. App. at 907, 802 P.2d at 836.
57. Id. See also State v. Fitzgerald, 39 Wash. App. 652, 659, 694 P.2d 1117, 1122
(1985) (holding inadmissible under Frye psychologist's testimony that child molesters
could have outward manifestations of good character because no evidence was
presented that the opinion was based on a generally accepted theory in the
psychological community), aff'd sub. nom. 110 Wash. 2d 403, 756 P.2d 105 (1988).
58. People v. Pitts, 273 Cal. Rptr. 757, 903 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
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Another California case that the state relies on, People v.
Mendibles,59 made clear that it was addressing the admissibility
of an expert opinion on the cause of a particular injury "'on
the basis of the expert's deduction from the appearance of the
injury itself.' "60 In Mendibles, the court asserted that Califor-
nia courts have never applied the Frye rule to expert medical
testimony, or even to psychiatric predictions or unusual
diagnoses.6'
Unlike California's courts, however, the Washington
courts have applied Frye to bar speculative psychological testi-
mony. Young stands for the proposition that evidence of a
colposcopic examination may be admitted into evidence. 62 It
does not contradict the well-established rule in Washington
that Frye applies to new, untested theories. Frye's application
requires that the state may not offer expert testimony that
purports to prove scientifically that an accused suffers from a
particular personality disorder or mental abnormality that
59. 245 Cal. Rptr. 553 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
60. Id. at 562 (citing People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291, 299-300 (Cal. 1984)). In dicta,
the court said that "a medical diagnosis based on medical literature will not be viewed
as a new scientific technique, but simply the development of an opinion from studies of
certain types of cases." Mendibles, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 562; People v. Phillips, 175 Cal.
Rptr. 703, 714 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). Phillips was a 3-2 appellate court decision finding
admissible a hypothetical question to a psychiatrist about a particular disease. It did
not address either a new scientific technique or "conflict within the scientific
community." Phillips, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 714. The appellant did not question the
trustworthiness or accuracy of the doctor's interpretation.
But the Mendibles court was not contemplating the kind of testimony the state's
psychologists offered here. It went on to illustrate the characteristics of those
instances in which diagnosis is considered to be no more than the expression of expert
medical opinion, including: an opinion that a death resulted from strangulation, a
conclusion that rectal abrasions indicate anal intercourse without lubricant, a
determination that death was caused by a blunt instrument, an analysis of whether a
wound was self-inflicted, the determination that certain bruises were not caused by a
fall, and the use of the battered child syndrome to determine that a child's injuries
were not accidental. Mendibles, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 562. It also said that less typical was
diagnosis of an esoteric form of mental illness known as "Munchausen's syndrome."
Id. at 563 (citing Phillips, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 715.) Such a diagnosis requires the
existence of a body of literature, involving the study of similar cases, upon which such
a diagnosis could be based. Id. No such body of literature exists concerning "sexual
predators," a term invented not by psychologists but by the legislature, and even if
such literature did exist, the witnesses herein went beyond diagnosis, acceptable to the
California court, to predict behavior. And the court emphasized that in Mendibles, it
was permitting testimony about the use of an instrument that "is nothing more than a
weak microscope--an instrument long accepted as scientifically reliable." Mendibles,
245 Cal. Rptr. at 563. Further, the doctor's "opinion was based entirely upon visual
examination and the observations she made therein." Id. at 563.
61. Mendibles, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 562.
62. State v. Young, 62 Wash. App. 895, 802 P.2d 829 (1991).
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makes him likely to commit "predatory" acts of sexual vio-
lence. The scientific evaluation of rape related to personality
disorders or mental illness and to prediction of future behavior
has not reached a level of reliability that meets the Frye stan-
dard and the state's proffered testimony should not be
admissible.
Even if one were to apply the Young analysis, Frye still
applies. Young teaches that there is a difference between
development of a new scientific technique, development of a
novel method of proof, and development of a body of medical
knowledge and expertise. Frye must still be applied in the sex
predator cases because the psychological determinations
involved fall into the first, rather than the last, category. The
state has never presented evidence in a sexual predator case of
development of a body of medical knowledge and expertise
either 1) identifying a personality disorder or mental abnor-
mality that makes one likely to commit sexual acts of violence
or 2) demonstrating that mental health professionals are able
to predict with certainty that people with such disorders or
abnormalities will in fact commit acts of violence.
While the state may wish that it could put microscopes in
prisoners' brains, it cannot do so yet. The Young case does not
apply.
Kafka's The Trial ends with the summary execution by
stabbing of the hero/accused. Even as the knife is plunging he
wonders whether an unseen appellate court might be coming
to his rescue at last. One can hope that the 1992 version of the
Kafka nightmare will have a happier ending.
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